We present evidence that busy outside directors are associated with weak corporate governance based on a sample of U.S. industrial firms from 1989 to 1995. When a majority of outside directors serve on three or more boards, firms exhibit lower market-to-book ratios as well as weaker operating profitability. Firms are also more likely to replace busy outside directors following poor performance. We show that when a majority of outside directors are busy, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is significantly lower than when a majority of outside directors are not busy. Analysis of announcements of board changes confirms that investors applaud departures of busy outside directors, and this pattern is pronounced for firms where the departure results in the majority of the remaining outside directors being not busy.
unable to detect any pattern indicating that poor firm performance influences board composition in a manner that cause a board's outside directors to become more busy. However, we do find that busy outside directors are less likely to be reappointed to the board when the firm is performing poorly, suggesting that these individuals are not sought to reverse poor firm performance.
We are sensitive to the concern that the market-to-book ratio tests are potentially misspecified since this ratio is also often used as a measure of growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992) and as a systematic risk factor (Fama and French, 1992) . Therefore, we conduct several additional tests that are relatively immune to this specification issue. Using panel-data regressions, we also find that an inverse relation holds between several accounting-based measures of operating performance and a majority of busy outside directors on the board.
Additional evidence that boards dominated by busy outside directors contribute to weaker corporate governance comes from the analysis of forced CEO turnover in our sample. We show that boards where the majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships are less likely to remove a CEO for poor performance. We confirm results of prior research that finds that independent boards are more likely to remove CEOs for poor performance than non-independent boards. We augment these findings by showing that this pattern holds largely when a majority of outside directors on the board are not deemed to be busy.
Our tests reveal that forced CEO turnover is insensitive to firm performance when the majority of outside directors are busy. This result suggests that the extent to which outside directors are busy is an important determinant of the effectiveness of outside-dominated boards in corporate governance.
Our final piece of evidence comes from analysis of announcements of outside director departures in our sample. We find that abnormal returns related to the announcement of departure of busy outside directors are significantly positive and significantly higher than the abnormal returns for departures of non-busy outside directors. Like the case-study evidence for Ms. Chao, we also find in our broader sample, that departures of busy outside directors are viewed particularly favorably when a majority of the remaining outside directors on the board are not busy.
Collectively, our results indicate that when a majority of outside directors are busy, firm performance suffers. However, we stop short of endorsing the recent efforts of institutional investors and corporate governance policy advocates in curbing the directorships held by outside directors for at least two reasons.
First, there is substantial evidence that outside directorships tend to be correlated with a director's reputational capital. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) note that the market for outside directorships provides an important source of incentives for outside directors to serve as monitors. Therefore, attempts to limit the number of outside directorships may reduce the strength of the incentives for some outside directors to engage in effective corporate governance. Second, our results relate primarily to the costs faced by firms that appoint busy outside directors, but we are silent on the benefits that appointing companies might obtain when their executives join other boards as outside directors. Recent work by Perry and Peyer (2003) shows that sending firms benefit when their executives receive additional directorships if measures of agency costs in these firms are relatively low. While our paper points to the potential benefits of limiting the number of board seats held by outside directors, policy recommendations on this issue should also incorporate the expected costs of curtailed director incentives and those borne by sending firms.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section I reviews the relevant literature and formulates our research questions. Section II describes our sample. Section III studies whether busy boards affect firm performance.
Section IV details our empirical tests on appointments and departures of outside directors. Section V investigates whether busy boards play a role during events of CEO turnover. Section VI analyzes investors' reactions related to the departure of busy outside directors. Section VII provides our conclusions. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the market for outside directorships serves as important source of incentives for outside directors to develop reputations as monitoring specialists. Mace (1996) suggests that outside directorships are perceived to be valuable because they provide executives with prestige, visibility, and commercial contacts.
I. Prior literature on directorships
Support for the reputational capital view of directorships comes from several studies that show that the number of boards that outside directors sit on is tied to the performance of the firms where these directors are incumbents, either as CEOs or outside directors. This pattern is documented for financially distressed companies (Gilson, 1990) , for firms that cut dividends (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990) , for companies that fire their CEOs (Farrell and Whidbee, 2000) , for firms that are sold (Harford, 2003) , for CEOs following retirement (Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999) , as well as for broad samples of firms (Yermack, 2004) . Accordingly, several studies have used the number of board seats held by an outside director as a proxy for their reputation in the external labor market (Shivdasani (1993) , Vafeas (1999) , and Brown and Maloney (1993) ).
While the number of directorships appears to be correlated with director reputational capital, other studies suggest that too many directorships may lower the effectiveness of outside directors as corporate monitors (see, for example, Core, Holthausen, and Larker (1999) , Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) ). Core et al. (1999) find that busy outside directors provide CEOs with excessive compensation packages, which in turn leads to weaker firm performance. Consistent with such a view, the National Association of Corporate Directors and the Council for Institutional Investors have adopted resolutions calling for limits on the number of directorships held by directors of publicly traded companies. 4 Ferris et al. (2003) test whether multiple board appointments by directors harm firm performance. They fail to detect any evidence of a systematic relation between the market-to-book ratio and the average number of board seats held by directors; they conclude that proposals calling for limits on multiple board appointments are misguided. However, several aspects of their research design prevent them from detecting the relation between multiple directorships and firm performance that we document.
First, the market-to-book ratio can measure both the value-added by management as well as the value of intangible assets such as future investment opportunities. Ferris et al. (2003) of the market-to-book ratio on director attributes but do not control for growth opportunities in these regressions, which confounds the interpretation of their results.
Second, unlike Ferris et al. (2003) who estimate a cross-sectional model using 1995 data, we analyze panel data using fixed-effects regressions. The fixed-effects approach is robust to the presence of omitted firmspecific variables that would lead to biased estimates in an ordinary least squares framework. Given the high correlation between the market-to-book ratio and corporate governance variables with numerous other company attributes, we view the fixed-effects framework as offering significantly more reliable estimates than ordinary least squares regressions.
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A third distinction between our paper and Ferris et al. (2003) is in the identification of busy boards.
They employ four measures to capture busy boards -three of these focus on directorships held by both inside and outside directors, while only one relates specifically to outside directors. For measuring busy outside directors, they calculate the average number of board seats held by outside directors. Unlike Ferris et al. (2003) , our variables focus exclusively on whether outside directors are busy under the premise that inside and gray directors sit on the board for reasons other than the monitoring of management. Further, as we describe below, there is wide dispersion in the number of board seats held by outside directors making the average number of directorships a noisy measure of whether outside directors as a group are busy. We therefore employ an alternative metric that treats boards to be busy if a majority of the outside directors sit on three or more boards.
Our paper is complementary to recent work by Perry and Peyer (2003) who examine announcement effects of outside director appointments for both sending and receiving firms. They find that when executives join other boards as outside directors, the announcement return for the sending firm is positive when the executive has high stock ownership or the firm has an independent board. They argue that when executives have strong incentives to enhance shareholder value, accumulation of board seats by these executives has a positive 5. Ferris et al. (2003) also use the average return on assets (ROA) over 1993 to 1995 as a measure of performance. As with their market-to-book ratio regressions, the ROA specifications do not control for firm-specific effects.
impact on firm value.
In sum, there is substantial evidence supporting the view that outside directorships serve as a measure of a director's reputational capital. However, there is disagreement on whether sitting on numerous boards detracts from the ability of outside directors to perform as effective monitors. Our tests are designed to address the question of whether directors that serve on numerous boards tend to contribute to weaker corporate governance at these firms.
II. Sample and data

A. Sample selection
Our sample consists of firms that appear in the 1992 Forbes 500 lists of largest corporations based on assets, sales, market capitalization, or net income during the seven-year period from 1989 to 1995. We impose three screening criteria. First, we require each company in the sample to have at least two consecutive years of financial data available in CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Second, relevant SEC filings have to be available on the Edgar data retrieval system. Third, as is typical for other studies of this type, utility and financial companies are excluded from the sample since regulatory effects may lead to a more limited role for their boards of directors. These criteria yield a final sample of 3,366 observations for 508 industrial companies across the seven years.
For each firm, we collect data on corporate governance variables from proxy statements filed for each company during the sample period. Each director is classified according to his/her principal occupation. Full-time employees of the firm are designated as insiders. Directors associated with the company, former employees, those with existing family or commercial ties with the firm other than their directorship, or those with interlocking directorships with the CEO are designated as "gray." Directors that do not fit the description for inside or gray are classified as outside directors.
Descriptive statistics for key variables for the 508 companies are presented in Panel A of Table II . On average, outside directors hold 3.11 directorships (the median is 2.89). We consider an outside director to be busy if they serve on three or more boards. Using this definition, 52% of outside directors in the sample are classified as busy. Perry and Peyer (2003) report a comparable frequency of busy outside directors in their sample.
To capture the prevalence of busy outside directors on the board, we construct a (0,1) indicator that takes the value of "one" if 50 percent or more of the board's outside directors are busy. Throughout the paper we refer to this variable as the "busy board" indicator. Panel A shows that 21% of the firms in the sample have "busy boards."
A typical board has approximately 12 directors, 55.33 percent of whom are outsiders. The average board meets just under eight times a year. These statistics are comparable to other recent studies such as Hallock (1997 ), Perry (1999 ), and Vafeas (1999 . In Table 2 , we also present the correlation of certain firm characteristics with the "busy board" indicator. This variable exhibits a positive correlation with the average directorships held by outside directors, director fees, the frequency of board meetings, firm age, operating profit margin, and total sales. We observe a negative correlation between "busy board" and the percentage of inside and gray directors, ownership by insiders, and CEOs from founding families.
We track annual appointments of outside directors to the boards of the 508 firms during the sevenyear period. Panel B of Table II presents key characteristics for the 2,314 individuals who are appointed as independent directors to the boards of these companies. A typical outsider is in her mid 50s and owns very little equity in the other boards she serves on. Most of the appointees (52 percent) replace another independent director. These characteristics are comparable to those reported by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) who study director appointments between 1994 and 1996. About 20 percent of all outside directors are current Forbes 500 executives, and almost 14 percent have no prior board experience. This last statistic is comparable to that reported by Ferris et al. (2003) who study director data for firms during the 1995 proxy season.
B. Average directorships vs. busy boards
Understanding what constitutes a "busy board" is a central issue underlying our tests. We consider boards to be busy if 50% or more of the outside directors hold 3 or more board seats instead of using the average number of directorships by outside directors to identify busy boards. At issue is the extreme skewness in the distribution of board seats held by outside directors. An example is helpful in illustrating this measurement issue.
Panels A through D of Table III However, 50% of the outside directors at Clorox are busy as compared to only 33% at MGM.
Panel E of Table III shows that a one-to-one correspondence between the average number of directorships and "busy boards" also fails to hold in the full sample. We divide the sample into 4 groups based on the percentage of outside directors that are classified as busy. When more than 75% of outside directors are busy, the average number of directorships per outside director is 3.35. However, when only 25% to 50% of outside directors are busy, the average number of directorships held by outside directors is 3.41.
Our measurement treats boards in the first group as busy, while Ferris et al. (2003) would consider firms in the second group to have busier boards. As we illustrate later, our measurement appears to illuminate a stronger link between busy boards and firm performance than using the average number of board seats variable.
III. Busy boards and firm performance
Our first set of tests involve panel-data estimates relating the market-to-book ratio to "busy boards" and other corporate governance and financial attributes. Because the market-to-book ratio also proxies for growth opportunities, we also estimate the relation between firm performance and busy boards using several measures of accounting performance. We report the results of several sensitivity checks to test the robustness of our findings.
A. Market-to-book ratio tests
We estimate firm-fixed effects regressions using the market-to-book ratio as the dependent variable.
We calculate the market-to-book ratio as the market value of the firm's equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm's assets and the book value of the firm's equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm's assets at the end of the year. This calculation closely follows that of Smith and Watts (1992) . The regressions control for corporate governance and financial characteristics likely to affect firm performance. Gilson (1990) finds that during periods of financial distress, firms reduce board size, and Yermack (1996) documents a negative and significant association between company valuation and board size. We include the log of board size in our tests. We control for firm size using the natural log of sales. Board composition is controlled for scaling the number of outside directors by board size. We also control for the percentage of the firm's common shares beneficially owned by company insiders because several studies have linked share ownership with factors that influence firm value. As Vafeas (1999) does, we include the natural log of meetings and the number of board committees as independent variables in the estimation. Our regressions also include the ratio of capital expenditures to sales as a measure of the firms' investment opportunity set. Throughout, the fixed-effects specification is employed to control for unobservable attributes such as company's history, culture, and product mix that potentially affect firm performance.
The results of the multivariate models are reported in Table IV . Model (1) shows that the coefficient for the "busy board" indicator is negative and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.03. In model (2), we use the percentage of outside directors that are busy and find a negative and significant coefficient on this variable as well. Therefore, both specifications indicate a negative and statistically significant relation between the presence of busy outside directors and the market-to-book ratio. Our estimates suggest that the impact of busy outside directors on firm performance is economically non-trivial. The coefficient estimate in model (1) indicates that a "busy board" reduces the market-to-book ratio by about 3.5 percent.
In model (3), we examine if the marginal impact of a busy outside director depends on whether or not a majority of the outside directors are busy. Model (3) includes an interaction term between the percentage of busy outside directors and the "busy board" indicator variable. The interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that, when a majority of outside directors are busy, the market-to-book ratio has a stronger negative association with the percentage of busy outside directors. This suggests that governance reforms that would reduce the fraction of busy directors for boards where a majority of outside directors are busy are likely to yield more significant valuation improvements.
Coefficient estimates for the control variables are in line with those reported by other studies. We obtain an inverse and statistically significant association between board size and firm performance (Yermack, 1996) , and find the number of board meetings is negatively associated with the market-to-book ratio (Vafeas, 1999) . The number of business segments is negatively related to performance (Berger and Ofek, 1995) , while ownership by officers and directors displays a positive and significant coefficient (Yermack, 1996) . As in Fich and Shivdasani (2003) , we find that firm size, but not the ratio of capital expenditures to sales, is positively associated with market-to-book ratios. We also find that the number of external directorships held by the incumbent CEO is inversely associated with the market-to-book ratio -this effect is significant at the 10% level. A possible explanation for this result is that CEOs of flourishing companies are less likely to take on directorships. Booth and Deli (1996) argue that CEOs are not enticed by outside directorships when they are focused on maximizing value in their own firms.
Using the fixed-effects framework, we are able to replicate the cross-sectional results of Ferris et al. (2003) in our sample. Ferris et al. (2003) measure how busy directors are by using the average numbers of directorships per director and directorships per outside director. Models (4) and (5) show that neither of these two variables display a significant association with the market-to-book ratio, similar to the results obtained by Ferris et al. (2003) . The contrast between these results and those shown in models (1) - (3) suggest that inferences on the effects of busy boards are sensitive to how the presence of busy directors is measured.
B. Operating performance tests
The market-to-book ratio is also often used as a measure of growth opportunities. Despite our controls for capital expenditures in the regressions, and additional robustness tests described in Section IV, we are concerned about the possible impact growth opportunities have on our coefficient estimates. To address this issue, we estimate the impact of busy boards on accounting measures of current performance, since these measures are less likely to be mechanically driven by growth opportunities. The fixed-effects regressions in Table V replace the market-to-book ratio with three different measures of operating performance. Table V use the return on assets (ROA), 6 as the dependent variable. These regressions produce results that are consistent with those in Table IV . For example, in model (1), the coefficient for the "busy board" indicator variable is negative and statistically significant (-0.00191, p-value = 0.00). This estimate indicates that ROA is about .2 percent lower in firms with busy boards.
Models (1) and (2) of
We also measure firm performance using two additional financial ratios: sales over assets (asset turnover ratio), and the return on sales, computed as operating income over net sales. We estimate fixedeffects regressions using these ratios as dependent variables, and present them as models (3) and (4) of Table   V . The busy board indicator yields a negative and significant coefficient of -0.031 with a p-value = 0.03 in the sales over assets regression, and -0.002 coefficient with a p-value = 0.00 in the return on sales regression.
6. We calculate ROA as operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) plus the decrease in receivables (Compustat item 2), the decrease in inventory (Compustat item 3), the increase in current liabilities (Compustat item 72) and the decrease in other current assets (Compustat item 68). We scale this measure by the average of beginning-and ending-year book value of total assets (Compustat item 6).
These results are consistent with our earlier findings and suggest that companies with busy boards tend to display weaker operating profitability than firms where boards are not busy.
C. Robustness checks C.1. Alternative hypothesis
While the preceding results support the view that busy outside directors are associated with lower firm performance, the findings could be consistent with other explanations. Gilson (1990) reports that distressed firms revamp their boards by making them more independent and by appointing turnaround specialists. Vafeas (1999) shows a positive association between the average directorships held by outside directors and meeting activity and Jensen (1993) indicates that boards maintain an unusually high level of meeting activity when they face declining performance. It is possible that busy outside directors tend to be appointed to boards of poorly performing companies if these directors are viewed to be helpful in formulating turnaround strategies. To control for this potential endogeneity, we re-estimate our regressions using one and two year lagged values of the "busy board" indicator and other corporate governance variables. These tests continue to yield an inverse and statistically significant association between firm performance and our busy board measures. We describe more detailed tests of this potential endogeneity in Section IV.
C.2. Size and performance proxies
We repeat the analyses presented in Table IV , using different proxies for firm size, replacing the natural log of sales by the natural log of capital, and by the natural log of assets.
7 These tests also yield an inverse association between "busy board" and performance. Our result is also robust to different constructions of the dependent variable. Instead of the Smith and Watts (1992) market-to-book ratio calculation, we use the 7. Total capital adds the market value of the firm's equity, book value, long-term debt, and an estimated market value of preferred stock. We calculate the market value of preferred stock by dividing preferred dividends over the prevailing yield on Moody's index of high-grade industrial preferred stocks.
Tobin's Q calculation of Perfect and Wiles (1994) , and the Q calculation in Shin and Stulz (2000) . These different constructions of the dependent variable do not qualitatively alter the results.
C.3. Characterizing busy outsiders
We use a less expansive definition of our key independent variable based on a slightly different procedure to identify busy outside directors. Following Core et al. (1999) , we code outside directors as busy when active outside directors hold three or more directorships or when retired outside directors hold six or more directorships, counting only their directorships in publicly traded companies. A board is defined as busy when 50 percent or more of its outside directors are individually classified as busy. We construct a (0,1) indicator under this criterion and perform regressions similar to those in Table IV . The coefficient estimate for a (0,1) independent variable under this taxonomy is -0.0391 (p-value = 0.06). This estimate is slightly larger in magnitude than that reported in Table IV , and yields qualitatively similar inferences.
C.4. Investment opportunities
Notwithstanding the results in Table V , a concern with the regressions presented in Table IV is whether we appropriately control for the role of the firm's investment opportunity set. Although we control for investment opportunities by including the ratio of capital expenditures to sales as an independent variable, we recognize the possibility that in the presence of financial constraints, growth opportunities may not be fully captured by capital expenditures. We therefore examine the robustness of our results to alternative controls for investment opportunities. Following Smith and Watts (1992) and Yermack (1996) , we use the ratio of R&D to sales, the depreciation expense to sales, the earnings-to-price ratio, and the variance of common stock returns instead of the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. The use of these different proxies for investment opportunities does not alter our results. Our proxies for busy outside directors continue to yield a negative and significant association with the market-to-book ratio in all specifications.
D. A sum-up
Results presented in this section indicate that firm performance, measured using both the market-tobook ratio as well as several measures of operating profitability is inversely related to the presence of a majority of outside directors that serve on three or more boards. The inverse association that we document holds for alternative constructs of the market-to-book ratio and for several different controls for investment opportunities. However, like Ferris et al. (2003) , we are unable to uncover such a relation using the average number of board seats held by all directors or by outside directors.
IV. Appointments and departures of busy outside directors
Results of Section III show a negative association between "busy boards" and firm performance. In this section, we turn to the potential endogeneity of busy outside directors with respect to performance.
Specifically, we test whether poorly performing firms are more likely to seek out new outside directors that sit on several boards under the premise that such directors have valuable reputations and/or experience that might be helpful in reversing poor performance.
8 Similarly, reputational concerns may affect how firm performance influences departures of outside directors. If poor firm performance leads boards to reappoint outside directors with multiple board seats, while denying reappointment to those serving on few boards, this pattern could explain the a negative association between busy boards and firm performance. To understand how firm performance affects changes in board composition, we study board appointments and departures within our sample.
As described in Section II, our sample firms appointed 2,314 outside directors during 1989 to 1995.
We track each of these outside directors until the year 2000 to determine which of these directors remain on the board and which subsequently departed the board. For each outside director appointed, we review both the
8. An alternative possibility is that poorly performing firms have difficulty attracting busy directors, who presumably have opportunities to serve on several boards. However, this potential endogeneity works against uncovering the negative relation between firm performance and busy outside directors that we document.
annual report as well as the firm's proxy statements to establish whether the appointed director remains on the board. We search the Wall Street Journal Index and Lexis/Nexis when we are able to identify a departure, and read newspaper stories and company press releases in order to ascertain the reason for the departure. We identify a total of 1,676 director departures among our sample. Of these, we are able to identify 360 departures as being voluntary. We classify a departure to be voluntary if the reason given for the director's departure is either to pursue other interests or to take a position elsewhere. We also record 490 departures related to board term limits, normal retirements, health problems, or death. In 826 instances, we are unable to precisely establish the reason for the departure. Of the 2,314 appointees, 638 continue serving as directors until the end of year 2000.
We conduct four tests using this sample of outside director appointments and departures. First, we estimate a maximum likelihood model of the number of board seats held by appointees. Second, we examine the factors that affect the likelihood that a busy director is appointed to the board. Third, we estimate a hazard model to understand the determinants of outside director departures. Our fourth test examines the probability that a busy director departs the board. In all tests, our primary focus is to understand whether firm performance has a significant impact on the types of outside directors that are appointed and depart from the board.
A. Multivariate analysis of the determinants of directorships
We estimate a Poisson maximum likelihood regression to investigate the determinants of directorships for the 2,314 appointees. The dependent variable is the count of the directorships held by each outside director. As independent variables, we include several variables to measure the appointing firm's performance. The regression includes appointee-specific characteristics such as age, gender, educational, and professional qualifications. We also include firm-specific attributes relating to the companies where the individual serves as a director. Unless the appointee is the CEO of another firm, we compute the average stock ownership by the outside director for all of the boards he/she serves on, as well as the average industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA), the market-adjusted stock return, and the average size (natural log of sales) of these firms. If the appointee is a CEO in another firm, we record the stock ownership, industry-adjusted ROA, the market-adjusted stock return, and the size of the firm where he/she serves as CEO.
The results of the Poisson model are reported in the first column of Table VI . 9 We find that neither the accounting nor the stock market performance of the appointing firm is related to the count of directorships held by outside director appointees. In contrast, the average performance of the firms on whose boards the directors sit on is positively associated with their directorship count. The coefficients on both the average directorship industry-adjusted ROA and the market-adjusted stock return are positive with p-values of 0.05 and 0.08, respectively.
We also observe that being a current or retired CEO of another firm positively affects the number of directorships held. In addition, being a director at larger companies is positively related to the number of directorships. This result is similar to that in Ferris et al. (2003) , and suggests that the increased visibility from sitting on boards of large companies may help some directors obtain more directorships. Finally, we find a lower count of directorships when directors have gray status at other boards, suggesting that firms avoid appointing board members that face potential conflicts of interests at other companies.
Overall, the results of the Poisson model indicate that the accumulation of directorships is positively related to the performance of the firms where the individual is an outside director, but we do not find evidence that poor performance causes appointing firms to seek outside directors that serve on several boards.
9. The Poisson model specifies that if λ is defined by log (λ) = Xβ, where X is a vector of independent variables and β is a parameter vector, then the probability of n outside directors' obtaining a directorship in a given year is given by: λ n e -λ / λ! The log-likelihood function of this specification is maximized over β to produce maximum likelihood estimates and is given as:
where C1 is a constant that does not change the maximization process, N is the number of firms, T is the number of time periods per firm and nit is the number of outside directors obtaining a directorship in firm i in year t.
B. Appointments of busy outside directors
To study appointments of busy outside directors, we estimate a logit model using the 2,314 appointees, where the dependent variable is set equal to "one" if the director holds three or more total directorships (i.e. is busy), and is set equal to "zero" otherwise. Independent variables are similar to those used in the Poisson estimation. Table VI shows that none of the measures of firm performance for the appointing firm are significantly associated with the probability of appointing a busy outside director. This result casts doubt on the idea that poor firm performance makes the appointment of a busy outside director more likely. As with the Poisson model estimates, we find companies are more likely to appoint a busy outside director when the other firms on whose boards they sit on perform better. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant for variables that measure the average industry-adjusted ROA and the average market-adjusted stock return for companies where the appointees are incumbent directors. In addition, companies are more likely to appoint busy outside directors if they tend to sit on boards of larger firms, and are current or retired CEOs of other companies. However, busy directors are less likely to be appointed if they are a gray director on another board or if they are in academia.
Finally, we find that appointments of busy outside directors are less likely if these directors have relatively high stock ownership on the other boards that they sit on. One interpretation of this result is suggested by the findings in Perry and Peyer (2003) who argue that executives with high stock ownership at their own firms will be reluctant to assume outside board appointments if it detracts from maximizing value at their own companies. Our result suggests a similar interpretation -outside directors with strong ownership incentives on their current boards might be reluctant to take on additional board seats since that constrains the amount of time they can spend monitoring on their current boards.
C. Departure hazard for outside directors
We use a hazard model to investigate the annual risk of departure for each director. The hazard specification is appropriate because it censors all departures related to board term limits or death as well as the observations for directors that continue serving at the end of our coverage period.
10
The results of the hazard model are presented in model (1) of Table VII . We find that poor firm performance is associated with a higher likelihood of outside director departure. The coefficient estimate on industry-adjusted ROA is negative and significant at the 1% level, similar to results in Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) . The results also reveal that the number of directorships is significantly related to the chance of departure. The coefficient for the number of directorships is positive and significant (0.170, p-value = 0.00) indicating that each additional directorship increases the hazard of voluntary departure by almost 19 percent.
Departures are about 13 percent more likely to occur in firms that appoint a new CEO during the year. However, directors that are CEOs of other companies are less likely to depart the board.
D. Firm performance and busy outside director turnover
Though the results of the hazard model indicate that directors with multiple board seats are more likely to depart, it is unclear whether firm performance affects the probability of departure of busy outside directors. To investigate this issue, we exclude the departures related to board term limits or death and divide the remaining 1,186 departures by whether or not the departing director holds three or more directorships. We estimate a logit model in column (2) of Table VII where the dependent variable takes the value of "one" if the 10. The statistical significance of a covariate is given by the log-likelihood ratio statistic. Under the null hypothesis that is the likelihood ratio statistic. We provide p-values for the test that an individual covariate is zero. For each covariate, we also report its risk ratio, a transformation of the estimated coefficient that is easier to interpret. The risk ratio is defined as the ratio of the hazard function under one set of covariates ( X ′ ) to the hazard under a base-case set of covariates ( 0 X ):
. For example, the percentage change in the hazard given a one-unit change in the k'th quantitative covariate is simply estimated as follows:
, which is reported as the risk ratio with the regression results.
departing outside director holds three or more directorships (i.e. is busy) and takes the value of "zero" otherwise.
The results illustrate a clear link between company performance and departure of busy outside directors. Coefficient estimates for the industry-adjusted stock return as well as industry-adjusted ROA are negative and statistically significant (p-values of 0.05 and 0.01, respectively). In terms of the marginal effects implied by the coefficient on stock returns, underperforming the industry by 50 percent increases the probability of busy outside director departure by 2 percentage points. Though this effect is not as large as that faced by CEOs forced from office under similar circumstances (6.8 percentage points for CEOs in our sample), the effect is meaningful when compared to the unconditional frequency of outside director turnover of 6.7 percent in the sample.
In addition to performance measures, we find aspects of the company's governance structure impact the probability of busy outside director departures. Busy directors are more likely to leave smaller boards and when the board is independent. This suggests that their departures are more likely when the board is predisposed to stronger monitoring.
We also find that busy outside directors are likely to depart when a new CEO takes office. In terms of the marginal effects implied by this coefficient estimate, if a new CEO is appointed, the probability of a simultaneous busy director departure increases by 4.9 percentage points. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Farrell and Whidbee (2000), and Yermack (2004) have found that outside directors are more likely to leave the board when a new CEO is appointed. Our results illustrate that this effect is more pronounced for busy outside directors. To put our results in perspective, Yermack (2004) estimates that a new CEO increases the probability of an outside director departure in the same year by 3.3 percentage points. Therefore, our estimates suggest that busy outside directors are substantially more likely to leave the board than non-busy outsiders when new CEOs are appointed.
In summary, we uncover evidence suggesting that the presence of busy outside directors is endogenous with respect to firm performance. However, since busy directors are more likely to depart following poor firm performance, the effect that we find works against our documented results on the inverse relation between performance and a majority of busy outside directors.
V. Busy boards and forced CEO turnover
As an additional test of the impact of busy boards on the quality of corporate governance, we study the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance in our sample. Besides providing direct evidence on how busy directors impact an important board decision, the advantage of this approach is that it is immune to the potentially confounding effect of growth opportunities that might be present in the market-to-book ratio regressions presented earlier.
We estimate logit models for the probability of forced CEO turnover while controlling for several firm and corporate governance attributes. We classify a turnover episode to be forced using a three-part rule similar to that in Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) . First, we classify turnover as forced if the Wall Street Journal reports that the CEO is fired, forced from office, or departs due to policy differences. Second, we classify turnover to be forced if the CEO is not close to retirement (60 years or more) and the Wall Street Journal does not report the reason for the departure as being death, poor health, or the assumption of another position (elsewhere or within the firm). Third, we classify a turnover episode as forced if the CEO is not of retirement age and the Wall Street Journal reports that the CEO is retiring, but does not announce the retirement at least six months prior to the departure. CEO turnover episodes occur for 11.28 percent, or 321 events, of the observations in our sample, a frequency similar to those in other studies such as Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) who report a 12 percent frequency using 1978 -1980 data, and Mehran and Yermack (1997 Our independent variable of interest is the "busy board" (0,1) indicator that takes the value of "one" if 50 percent or more outside directors hold three or more directorships. As a measure of performance, we use the industry-adjusted stock return for the year preceding the turnover. To control for CEO retirement, we construct a (0,1) variable to indicate whether the CEO is near retirement (age 60 or older), and another (0,1) variable to indicate an independent board. A board is classified to be independent if 50 percent or more of its directors are outside directors. Other control variables include company size, measured as the natural log of sales, the natural log of board size, and the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors, outside directors, and the CEO. The models control for the natural log of the years the CEO has been in office.
Finally, Mehran and Yermack (1997) find an inverse association between the probability of voluntary CEO turnover and the value of stock option compensation in relation to total pay. Thus, we add the Black-Scholes value of the options granted to the CEO scaled by total pay as an independent variable in the regression. All models include (0,1) year indicators. Table VIII presents the results of four logit models based on 2,844 CEO-year observations drawn from our 508 firms from 1989 to 1995. Below each estimate, we report heteroskedasticity adjusted p-values in parentheses. Regression (1) confirms results from prior studies that forced CEO turnover is sensitive to firm performance. In terms of the marginal effects implied by the coefficient in model (1), (-0.30, pvalue=0 .00), underperforming the industry by 50 percent in the prior year increases the probability of forced CEO turnover by 6.82 percentage points.
Regression (2) includes the control variables discussed earlier. In general, we find these variables to influence CEO turnover in a manner consistent with that reported in previous research. For example, forced CEO turnover is less likely to occur for individuals of retirement age (Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2003) .
CEOs are less likely to be forced out of office if they own large amounts of stock or belong to the founding family (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997) . As in Mehran and Yermack (1997), we find no significant association between forced turnover and stock-option compensation for the CEO. We find a positive association between board independence and forced CEO turnover. This result is similar to that in Parrino (1997) , who finds that a higher percentage of non-officer directors is involved in forced, but not in voluntary, CEO turnovers. Like Hadlock and Lumer (1997), we find that the tenure of the CEO is not related to a forced departure.
Regression (2) also confirms the effect of independent boards on the turnover-performance relation in our sample by including an interaction term between firm performance and the independent board indicator.
The coefficient for this interaction term is positive (-0.34, p-value = 0.08), and the sum of the coefficients on industry-adjusted stock return and the interaction term (-0.61 = -0.27 -0.34) is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This finding indicates that the performance-turnover relation is stronger in the presence of independent boards, a result that is similar to that described in Weisbach (1988).
Regression (3) estimates the impact of the "busy board" indicator by including the interaction between the busy board indicator and firm performance. We find that "busy boards" have a significant impact on the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to performance. The interaction term yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient (p-value = 0.03), implying that the turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly lower when the outside directors are busy than when they are not busy. In fact, inspection of coefficient estimates on firm performance and the busy board interaction variable shows that CEO turnover is completely insensitive to firm performance when a majority of outside directors are busy (-0.03 = -0.27 + 0.24, p-value = 0.68). The estimates suggest that a 50% decline in industry-adjusted return increases the probability of CEO turnover by about 5.5 percentage points when outside directors are not busy, but only by 0.78 percentage points when outside directors are busy.
Regression (4) explores this result further in the context of Weisbach's (1988) findings on the importance of an independent board on turnover-performance sensitivities. We explore if the effect of independent boards on CEO turnover depends upon whether a majority of the outside directors are busy. We do so by including a three-term interaction between firm performance, the "busy board" indicator, and the independent board indicator. The coefficient on this variable measures whether the turnover-performance sensitivity when the board is both independent and a majority of outside directors are busy, differs from turnover-performance sensitivity in other firms. The interaction term is positive and significant at the 8% level. The coefficient estimate implies that an independent board with busy outsiders significantly weakens the turnover-performance relation (-0.26 + 0.13 = -0.13, p-value = 0.17). For a 50% decline in industryadjusted return, CEO turnover probability rises by 10.8 percentage points when the board is both independent and not busy, but by only 2.96 percentage points when the board is independent and busy. This result shows that busy outside directors severely ameliorate the effect of board independence on the turnover-performance relation.
VI. Valuation impact of busy outside director departures
The case-study evidence for Elaine Chao described in the Introduction suggests that investors viewed her departure from the boards she served on as favorable news. We use the incidence of outside director departures to study whether this pattern holds in a broader sample. If busy outside directors contribute to weaker corporate governance, we expect that their departure should be associated with a positive market reaction.
To focus on departures that are not perfectly anticipated due to retirements, term limits, etc., we study the 360 voluntary departure episodes in the sample. We drop observations coinciding with other major company announcements and when the exact date of departure cannot be established. This screening procedure results in a sample of 243 departures. We use the standard event-study methodology (Dodd and Warner, 1983) to compute abnormal returns (ARs) for the announcement date. Market model parameters are computed from one year of trading data preceding the event window.
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Results of the event study are reported in Panel A of Table IX . We observe that positive and statistically significant ARs are associated with all voluntary departure episodes; however, the mean and median ARs (1.33 percent and 0.8 percent) related to the departure of busy outside directors are larger than 11. To control for possible bias on the market model parameters, we re-estimate our ARs with simple net-ofmarket returns in place of market model returns. This estimation generates similar results to those we obtain with the market model parameters.
the ARs (0.9 percent and 0.34 percent) for non-busy outside directors. These differences are statistically significant with a t-statistic of 1.99 and a Z-statistic of 3.16. These results are in agreement with those presented in Table I , and indicate that, on average, departure of busy outside directors is welcome news for shareholders.
Investor reactions suggest that busy outside directors are less effective monitors and that their departure signals that more effective monitoring is on the way. An alternative explanation suggested by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) is that some outside directors acquire conflicts of interests over time and switch status to gray directors. If this pattern is pervasive, our results might instead capture the effect of replacing gray directors on the board. To examine this possibility, we check whether the status of outside directors changed to gray during their tenure. We find that only 5 of the 198 non-busy outside directors and 2 of the 45 busy outside directors in our subsample acquire conflicts of interest during their tenure to warrant a change in classification to gray status. Using a different sample of director appointments, Yermack (2004) also reports that relatively few outside directors change their status to gray over their tenure. When we repeat the event-study excluding these 7 observations, we obtain returns similar to those tabulated.
While the event-study suggests that investors view the departure of busy outside directors favorably, it is possible that the departures trigger other changes that investors also favor. For example, it is possible that the departure changes the balance of power between the CEO and the board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), or that the size of the board is reduced (Yermack, 1996) . In some circumstances, the departure may also be advantageous for the firm because the departing director might be able to help the firm in his/her new position.
Another possibility is that the remaining board is less likely to be busy after a busy director's departure. Of the 45 boards that lost a busy outside director, 18 firms switched status from a busy board to a non-busy board. In these firms, the percentage of outside directors that were busy declined from above 50% to less than 50% after the departure. We conduct an event study for the 45 companies that lost a busy director.
Panel B of Table IX summarizes the ARs for the 45 firms that lost a busy director, broken down according to whether the majority of the remaining outside directors on the board are busy or non-busy. Mean and median
ARs for firms where a majority of outside directors are not busy after the departure are 2.2% and 2.1%, respectively. In contrast, ARs for the other 27 companies where a majority of outside directors remain busy are 0.7% (mean) and 0.45% (median). The difference between the two subsamples is statistically significant using both the t-test and the Wilcoxon test. This suggests that investors react more favorably to busy outside director departures that have a significant impact on the extent to which outside directors as a group remain busy.
VII. Conclusions
In an era of heightened corporate governance scrutiny, substantial debate has focused on the effectiveness of the monitoring by the board of directors in large, publicly traded corporations. A significant element of this debate is centered on whether outside directors serving on several boards should cut back on their directorships or be required to do so. A common view among investors and policy advocates is that serving on numerous boards can result in overstretched directors that may not be effective monitors on any board.
We present evidence confirming this popular view using a panel of large U.S. industrial firms from 1989 to 1995. We focus on boards where a majority of outside directors sit on three or more boards and present several results that highlight the effect that these busy outside directors have on corporate value and governance.
We find that companies with a majority of busy outside directors display significantly lower marketto-book ratios. All else equal, firms with busy outside directors have market-to-book ratios about 3.5 percent lower than other firms. As a basis for comparison, results in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2004) imply that, during the 1990 to 1995 period, a 1 point increase in their composite "Governance Index" reduces the marketto-book ratio by an average 3.37 percentage points. Evidence of weaker performance by companies with busy outside directors is also obtained in measures of operating performance. We show that firms with busy boards display lower operating return on assets, lower asset turnover ratios, as well as lower operating return on sales and that this effect is also economically meaningful.
Analysis of changes in board composition show that appointments of directors who hold three or more directorships are not more likely to occur in firms that are performing poorly, casting doubt on the idea that such directors might be sought to improve firm performance. In contrast, we find that in underperforming firms, outside directors who hold three or more directorships are more likely to leave a board than other outside directors.
Examination of forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivities provides further direct evidence of the impact of busy outside directors on corporate governance. We find that the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly lower for firms with busy boards. The effect is economically large -a 50% decline in industry-adjusted performance increases the probability of turnover by 5.5 percentage points when the board is not busy, but the probability rises by less than 1 percentage point when a majority of outside directors are busy. The joint impact of a busy board and an independent board is particularly large.
Independent boards where outsiders are not busy are associated with a 10.8 percentage points higher likelihood of CEO turnover for a 50% drop in industry-adjusted performance, but the corresponding change in CEO turnover probability is only about 3 percentage points higher for independent boards where a majority of outside directors are busy.
Further support for the effects of busy outside directors comes from event-study results of outside director departure announcements. We find that departures of outside directors are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns that average 1.33% at the announcement. The abnormal returns are significantly more positive when fewer than 50% of the remaining outside directors are busy after the departure.
Collectively, these results indicate that boards relying heavily on outside directors that serve on several boards are likely to experience a decline in their quality of corporate governance. However, we are reluctant to conclude with recommendations mandating limits on the number of boards that directors should serve on. Our analysis does not include other potential effects of such limits, such as the effect on directors' incentives to establish reputations as expert monitors in the market for directorships, and the potential valuation effects for companies that send their executives to serve as outsiders on other boards. Nonetheless, based on the evidence in this paper, we are inclined to suggest that for some firms, the optimal board design entails a lower reliance on outside directors that serve on numerous boards. Shivdasani, A., 1993, Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 167-198. Shivdasani, A., and Yermack, D., 1999, CEO involvement Table I Investor Reaction to Elaine Chao's Cabinet Nomination Three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the firms where Elaine L. Chao served as an outside director. CARs are computed for all firms around December 28, 2000 (day "0"), the day when the Wall Street Journal first announced that Elaine L. Chao would join President-elect George W. Bush's cabinet. The sample includes the following firms: C.R. Bard, Clorox, Columbia/HCA Healthcare, Dole Food, Northwest Airlines, and Protective Life. Following her confirmation as secretary of labor Ms. Chao resigned her directorships in these firms. We report t-statistics and Wilcoxon rank Z statistics, using a two-tailed test for significance. Panel B shows results broken down according to whether boards busy after Elaine Chao's departure. Boards are considered to be busy if 50% or more of outside directors sit on three or more boards. 1989 and 1995. Companies are included in the sample if they are listed by Forbes magazine as one of the largest U.S. public corporations in its 1992 survey of the 500 largest U.S. public companies in any of the categories of market capitalization, sales, net income, or assets. The sample excludes private, utility, and financial companies. The table presents the mean, median, and standard deviation for each variable, as well as the Spearman sample correlation coefficient between all variables and a (0,1) indicator that is "one" if is the board is defined as busy, this occurs when 50 percent or more of the board's outside directors hold three or more directorships. a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Panel B shows characteristics of 2,314 outside directors appointed to the boards of our sample firms from 1989 to 1995. Outside directors are those that are not current or former employees of the firm, are not relatives of the CEO, have no business deals with the firm other than their directorship, and do not have interlocking directorships with the CEO. Data on director characteristics are obtained from annual proxy statements.
Panel
Panel A 
Table III Directorships by Outside Directors
Panels A through D report the total number of directorships held by outside directors, the mean directorships per outside director, and the percentage of outside directors holding 3 or more directorships for four companies in our dataset during the 1993 proxy season. The total number of directorships simply counts the number of total boards of publicly traded firms where the outside director serves. We do not count board service in private firms, charitable institutions, or not-for-profit organizations. The last row in each panel provide a (0,1) variable for whether boards are busy. We code boards as busy, with a "one," if 50 percent or more outside directors hold three or more total directorships. Panel A reports mean directorships per outside director and per board for our sample the firms according to the percentage of outside directors holding three or more directorships. Directorships per outside director are estimated as the total directorships held by outside directors divided by the number of outside directors. Similarly, directorships per director are all directorships held by every director divided by board size. 
Table IV Busy Outside Directors and Firm Performance
This table presents fixed-effects regressions of firm performance and busy outside directors. All regressions use the market-to-book ratio as the dependent variable. We calculate the market-to-book ratio as the market value of the firm's equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm's assets and the book value of the firm's equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm's assets at the end of the year. This calculation closely follows that of Smith and Watts (1992) . Regressions (1) uses a (0,1) dummy variable that is "one" if 50 percent or more of the board's outside directors individually hold three or more directorships as the key independent variable. Regression (2) uses the percentage of outside directors that hold three or more directorships (i.e., are busy) as the key independent variable. All other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text. The sample is described in panel A of Table I . We report White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust p-values in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), sales over assets, and return on sales. We first sum operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) plus the decrease in receivables (Compustat item 2), the decrease in inventory (Compustat item 3), the increase in current liabilities (Compustat item 72), and the decrease in other current assets (Compustat item 68). We scale this measure by the average of beginning-and ending-year book value of total assets (Compustat item 6) to find ROA Similarly, we divide this measure by the average of beginning-and ending-year sales to compute ROS. We use the log of total capital as a proxy for firm size. Regressions (1), (2), and (3) use a (0,1) dummy variable that is "one" if 50 percent or more of the board's outside directors individually hold three or more directorships as the key independent variable. Regression (2) uses the percentage of outside directors that hold three or more directorships (i.e., are busy) as the key independent variable. All other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text. The sample consists of Forbes 500 firms from 1989 to 1995 described in Panel A of Table I 
Table VI Determinants of Directorships and Appointments of Busy Outside Directors
The first column presents Poisson maximum likelihood estimates for the determinants of the number of directorships held by outside directors. The dependent variable counts the number of directorships held by the outside director. The second column presents logit estimates for busy directors. The dependent variable takes the value of "one" if the outside director holds three or more total directorships and the value of "zero" otherwise. The sample consists of 2,314 outside directors appointed to the boards of our 508 sample firms from 1989 to 1995. Unless the director is a CEO of another firm, we compute the average ownership of the outside director on all of the boards he serves on, as well as the average industry-adjusted ROA and size of these firms. If the appointee is a CEO in another firm, we simply record his ownership, the industryadjusted ROA, and the size of the firm where he serves as chief executive. We use the natural log of sales to proxy for firm size in the Poisson regression and the natural log of the market value of assets in the Logit model. All industry-adjustments are done by subtracting the median of the variable matching by 2-digit SIC code. We report pvalues under parentheses. Estimates for the departure of outside directors appointed to the boards of Forbes 500 firms. We follow directors appointed between 1989 and 1995 until the year 2000. We are able to identify a total of 360 voluntary departures during our coverage period. We classify a departure to be voluntary if the reason given for the director's departure is either to pursue other interests or to take a position elsewhere. We also record 490 departures related to board term limits, normal retirements, health problems, or death. In 826 instances we are unable to exactly establish the reason for the departure; we also note that 638 executives continue serving as directors at the end of our coverage period. Model (1) estimates a hazard regression associated with departures of the 2,314 directors appointed to the boards of our sample firms. Risk ratios appear in parentheses below each covariate estimate. Model (2) estimates a logit regression where the dependent variable is "1" if the departing director holds three or more directorships, and the value of "0" otherwise. The sample is reduced to 1,186 observations because we exclude departures corresponding to board term limits or death. We report heteroskedasticity robust p-values below each logit estimate. In both models, a, b and c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Table VIII Busy Outside Directors and Forced CEO Turnover
Logit coefficient estimates of forced CEO turnover. The dependent variable takes the value of "one" if the CEO is forced out of office and the value of "zero" otherwise. The independent variables are as follows. Busy outsiders is a dummy variable that is "one" if 50 percent or more of the outside directors hold three or more directorships. Stock return is the industry-adjusted stock return in the year before the turnover episode. A board is classified to be independent if 50 percent or more of its directors are independent, thus, we construct an indicator that is "one" in these cases and is "zero" otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total sales (Compustat item 12). CEO of retirement age is a dummy variable that is "one" if the CEO is aged 60 years or older. CEO stock compensation divides the Black-Scholes value of the options granted during the year by base pay. CEO tenure measures the years the CEO has held the chief executive job. The different ownership for the CEO, institutions, and outside directors is measured as a percentage of common. The sample consists of 2,844 CEO-year observations drawn from 508 Forbes 500 firms from 1989 to 1995. White (1980) 
